Mr. Martin Kamarck

Principal, MAKO Consulting LLC


          What is a GLG Leader?|The Gerson Lehrman Group&reg; (GLG) Leader Program<sup>SM</sup> is our premium Member Program<sup>SM</sup>. Those identified as GLG Leaders are in the top 5% of GLG CouncilRank and have an exclusivity agreement with GLG.

Member of the Financial Services Council

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Council Member Biography

Currently a Principal of Elanus Capital Management, an alternative asset manager specializing in bank "reg cap" trades; responsible for underwriting and due diligence strategies. As principal of MAKO Credit Risk Consulting, advised 50+ clients. Recent engagements include M&A due diligence in mortgage and title insurance industries, technical assistance for Ghanaian Association of Leasing Companies, and strategic advisory for Quadrant Structured Credit Products. Other representative clients: a European public company (offshore specialty reinsurance) and Booz Allen Hamilton (catastrophic risk). Over 32 years of experience in law & business and public & private sectors, with expertise in credit risk management & structured finance and structured credit. Senior positions in the financial guaranty industry for over 13 years: as General Counsel & Co-Founder of the Structured Finance business at FGIC (Jan 1987 - Mar 1993); and as President of Radian's FG businesses (Apr 1999 - Jan 2006). Prior to Radian, appointed by President and confirmed by Senate as the President and Chair of the US Ex-Im Bank; top secret security clearance. Began career in law as a Partner with Morrison & Foerster. (This is me - Update Profile)


Employment History

2006 - Unspecified
Principal, MAKO Consulting LLC
1999 - 2006
President, RADIAN GROUP INC.
1997 - 1999
President, COO, AEW CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.
1993 - 1997
Chairman & President, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
1987 - 1993
Managing Director, FINANCIAL GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY
1975 - 1986
Partner/Chair East Coast Business Practice, MORRISON AND FOERSTER LLP

GLG NewsSM Analyses by Martin Kamarck

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Beyond Credit Enhancement: The Value of Risk Management

March 9, 2009

Buffett Warns Insured Muni Bonds Could Be Next Shoe to Drop | www.tradingmarkets.com

The Bond Buyer headline: A default is a default, is a default, is a default. For bond issues most vulnerable to fiscal stresses, monoline insurers "write themselves into the indenture," with surveillance rights, reporting requirements and -- most imprtantly -- covenants and remedies more akin to an (old fashioned) bank loan than a bond issue. Especially with their portfolios of insured risks under stress, the monolines will aggressively exercise those rights as proxy for bondholders, so insured bondholders should be, generally, better protected. If, in his haste to cash in on the market opportunity in muni bond insurance, Buffett missed this basic element of the business, then BHAC's loss experience could be much worse than predicted.

With the GSEs "Nationalized," Will There Still be a Market for Mortgage Insurance?

September 15, 2008

U.S. bails out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, ousts CEOs | www.bizjournals.com

The GSEs succeeded in supporting the creation of a broad, deep, liquid national market for mortgages.  They used their market power to impose standardization on mortgage terms and underwriting.  Thus was born the "conforming mortgage." Mortgage insurance is an artifact of this history.  It is an inefficient and (at the individual whole loan level) unnecessary credit enhancement.  But the rumors of MI's demise are premature. The last thing the new management of the GSEs want to do is spook the markets with sudden moves, loud noises or big changes. That said, there will be pressure to impose much more rigorous capital allocation/portfolio risk management controls.  Politically, they can't reduce volume, per se, immediately at least, but the management of counterparty risk exposure to the MIs may well become more active. Bad news for weaker MIs.   Later the survivors will again be caught between price competition and "innovation" (bad risk) in a smaller market.

With the GSEs "Nationalized," Will There Still be a Market for Mortgage Insurance?

September 12, 2008

U.S. bails out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, ousts CEOs | www.bizjournals.com

The GSEs succeeded in supporting the creation of a broad, deep, liquid national market for mortgages.  They used their market power to impose standardization on mortgage terms and underwriting.  Thus was born the "conforming mortgage." Mortgage insurance is an artifact of this history.  It is an inefficient and (at the individual whole loan level) unnecessary credit enhancement.  But the rumors of MI's demise are premature. The last thing the new management of the GSEs want to do is spook the markets with sudden moves, loud noises or big changes. That said, there will be pressure to impose much more rigorous capital allocation/portfolio risk management controls.  Politically, they can't reduce volume, per se, immediately at least, but the management of counterparty risk exposure to the MIs may well become more active. Bad news for weaker MIs.   Later the survivors will again be caught between price competition and "innovation" (bad risk) in a smaller market.

With the GSEs "Nationalized," Will There Still be a Market for Mortgage Insurance?

September 12, 2008

U.S. bails out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, ousts CEOs | www.bizjournals.com

The GSEs succeeded in supporting the creation of a broad, deep, liquid national market for mortgages.  They used their market power to impose standardization on mortgage terms and underwriting.  Thus was born the "conforming mortgage." Mortgage insurance is an artifact of this history.  It is an inefficient and (at the individual whole loan level) unnecessary credit enhancement.  But the rumors of MI's demise are premature. The last thing the new management of the GSEs want to do is spook the markets with sudden moves, loud noises or big changes. That said, there will be pressure to impose much more rigorous capital allocation/portfolio risk management controls.  Politically, they can't reduce volume, per se, immediately at least, but the management of counterparty risk exposure to the MIs may well become more active. Bad news for weaker MIs.   Later the survivors will again be caught between price competition and "innovation" (bad risk) in a smaller market.

It's not how broadly you spread it; it's how deep.

February 28, 2008

Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit Test | www.nytimes.com

Lesson of monoline debacle: Core issue is concentration of counterparty risk. 

View All GLG News SM Analyses by Martin Kamarck